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The case for increasing the monetary level for felony theft.

by Tiana Herring, June 10, 2020

Each state sets a statutory definition of which thefts are felonies (punishable by longer sentences in prison) and which are misdemeanors (punishable by shorter sentences in jail). But in many states, the dollar amount separating felony theft from misdemeanor theft has not been increased in years, even though inflation makes the older laws more punitive each year.

These limits vary from New Jersey (a $200 theft is a fourth-degree felony) to Texas and Wisconsin where a theft must be worth $2,500 before you can get a state prison sentence. New Jersey’s limit is so low because it is one of the oldest in the country — it remains unchanged from when it was originally enacted in 1978.1 Only one state — Alaska — automatically adjusts the felony theft threshold with inflation.2 The range between the states is tremendous:

Table showing felony theft thresholds in each state as of 2018. For more detail including the amount of the previous threshold for most states, see the appendix table below. *The exact year of the last update to the felony theft threshold in each state was not readily available for all states, but Pew Charitable Trusts’ 2018 article reports that that the felony theft threshold in these states predate the year 2000.
State Felony Theft Threshold Year Threshold Last Updated
Alabama $1,500 2015
Alaska $1,000 2016
Arizona $1,000 2006
Arkansas $1,000 2011
California $950 2010
Colorado $2,000 2013
Connecticut $2,000 2009
Delaware $1,500 2009
District of Columbia $1,000 2010
Florida $750 2019
Georgia $1,500 2012
Hawaii $750 2016
Idaho $1,000 before 2000*
Illinois $500 2010
Indiana $750 2013
Iowa $1,000 before 2000*
Kansas $1,500 2016
Kentucky $500 2009
Louisiana $1,000 2017
Maine $1,000 before 2000*
Maryland $1,500 2016
Massachusetts $1,200 2018
Michigan $1,000 before 2000*
Minnesota $1,000 2007
Mississippi $1,000 2014
Missouri $750 2014
Montana $1,500 2009
Nebraska $1,500 2015
Nevada $650 2011
New Hampshire $1,000 2010
New Jersey $200 1978
New Mexico $500 2006
New York $1,000 before 2000*
North Carolina $1,000 before 2000*
North Dakota $1,000 2013
Ohio $1,000 2011
Oklahoma $1,000 2016
Oregon $1,000 2009
Pennsylvania $2,000 before 2000*
Rhode Island $1,500 2012
South Carolina $2,000 2010
South Dakota $1,000 2005
Tennessee $1,000 2016
Texas $2,500 2015
Utah $1,500 2010
Vermont $900 2006
Virginia $1,000 2020
Washington $750 2009
West Virginia $1,000 before 2000*
Wisconsin $2,500 2001
Wyoming $1,000 2004

Updating felony theft statutes is one simple way to reduce the number of people serving time in prison for low-level offenses. Making more minor thefts into misdemeanors will also spare more people from the often lifelong collateral consequences of felony convictions that can limit their access to public housing, welfare benefits, and even voting.

Decreasing the punishment for minor thefts is unlikely to encourage more thefts. As Pew Charitable Trusts found in their invaluable 2018 report, States Can Safely Raise Their Felony Theft Thresholds, Research Shows, South Carolina’s property crime rates actually continued to fall years after the threshold increased. This isn’t unique to South Carolina, either. Pew’s article also included a brief comparison of crime rates in all 50 states, reporting that between 2000 and 2012, the 30 states that increased their thresholds had property crime rates similar to the 20 states that had not yet updated their laws.

 

Footnotes

  1. See New Jersey Statute 2C:20-3 (Chapter 95, Laws of 1978)  ↩

  2. See Alaska Statute 11.46.982.  ↩

Appendix table

This table was built from The Effects of Changing Felony Theft Thresholds (2017) and States Can Safely Raise Their Felony Theft Thresholds, Research Shows (2018) by Pew Charitable Trusts and supplemented with additional research by the Prison Policy Initiative for Florida and Virginia which changed their laws after Pews’ reports, as well as New Jersey and Wisconsin, for which we found the year the threshold was last updated. *The exact year of the last update to the felony theft threshold in each state was not readily available for all states, but Pew Charitable Trusts’ 2018 article reports that that the felony theft threshold in these states predate the year 2000.
State Felony Theft Threshold Year Threshold Last Updated Previous Felony Theft Threshold
Alabama $1,500 2015 $500
Alaska $1,000 2016 $750
Arizona $1,000 2006 $250
Arkansas $1,000 2011 $500
California $950 2010 $400
Colorado $2,000 2013 $1,000
Connecticut $2,000 2009 $1,000
Delaware $1,500 2009 $1,000
District of Columbia $1,000 2010 n/a
Florida $750 2019 $300
Georgia $1,500 2012 $500
Hawaii $750 2016 $300
Idaho $1,000 before 2000* n/a
Illinois $500 2010 $300
Indiana $750 2013 any amount
Iowa $1,000 before 2000* n/a
Kansas $1,500 2016 $1,000
Kentucky $500 2009 $300
Louisiana $1,000 2017 $750
Maine $1,000 before 2000* n/a
Maryland $1,500 2016 $1,000
Massachusetts $1,200 2018 $250
Michigan $1,000 before 2000* n/a
Minnesota $1,000 2007 $500
Mississippi $1,000 2014 $500
Missouri $750 2014 $500
Montana $1,500 2009 $1,000
Nebraska $1,500 2015 $500
Nevada $650 2011 $250
New Hampshire $1,000 2010 $500
New Jersey $200 1978 n/a
New Mexico $500 2006 $250
New York $1,000 before 2000* n/a
North Carolina $1,000 before 2000* n/a
North Dakota $1,000 2013 $500
Ohio $1,000 2011 $500
Oklahoma $1,000 2016 $500
Oregon $1,000 2009 $750
Pennsylvania $2,000 before 2000* n/a
Rhode Island $1,500 2012 $500
South Carolina $2,000 2010 $1,000
South Dakota $1,000 2005 $500
Tennessee $1,000 2016 $500
Texas $2,500 2015 $1,500
Utah $1,500 2010 $1,000
Vermont $900 2006 $500
Virginia $1,000 2020 $500
Washington $750 2009 $250
West Virginia $1,000 before 2000* n/a
Wisconsin $2,500 2001 $1,000
Wyoming $1,000 2004 $500

Police disproportionately target Black and other marginalized people in stops, arrests, and use of force; and are increasingly called upon to respond to problems, such as homelessness, that are unrelated to public safety.

by Wendy Sawyer, June 5, 2020

Many of the worst features of mass incarceration — such as racial disparities in prisons — can be traced back to policing. Our research on the policies that impact justice-involved and incarcerated people therefore often intersects with policing issues. Now, at a time when police practices, budgets, and roles in society are at the center of the national conversation about criminal justice, we have compiled our key work related to policing (and our discussions of other researchers’ work) in one briefing.

 

1. Nearly 1 million people in the U.S. experience the threat or use of force by police annually, and they are disproportionately Black and Latinx.

chart showing that police are twice as likely to use force against people of color. Over 5% of Black and Hispanic survey respondents reported experiencing the threat or use of force when most recently approached by police, compared to just 2% of white respondents The scale of police use of force is an important fact in and of itself, made more troubling by the racial disparities evident in police stops and use of force. In a national survey, Black respondents were more likely to be stopped by police than white or Latinx respondents, and both Black and Latinx respondents were more likely to be stopped multiple times over the course of a year than white respondents. The survey also showed that when they initiated a stop, police were twice as likely to threaten or use force against Black and Latinx respondents than whites. These disparate experiences have predictable effects on public trust in police: white respondents were more likely to view police use of force as legitimate and more likely to seek help from police than were people of color.

 

2. Over 4.9 million people are arrested each year.

pie chart style illustration showing that of the 4.9 million people arrested and jailed each year, 3.5 million have just one arrest, 928,000 have two arrests, and 428,000 have 3 or more arrests that year In all, there are over 10 million arrests in the U.S. each year, but many people are arrested multiple times per year. From responses to a national survey, we estimate that at least 4.9 million unique individuals are arrested and jailed each year, and at least one in four of those individuals are arrested more than once in the same year. The massive scale of these police responses means that there are millions of opportunities each year for police-civilian encounters to turn violent or fatal, and an estimated 77 million people are now saddled with a criminal record.

 

3. Most policing has little to do with real threats to public safety: the vast majority of arrests are for low-level offenses. Only 5% of all arrests are for serious violent offenses.

The “massive misdemeanor system” in the U.S. is an important but overlooked contributor to overcriminalization and mass incarceration. For behaviors as benign as jaywalking, sitting on a sidewalk, or petty theft, an estimated 13 million misdemeanor charges sweep droves of Americans into the criminal justice system each year (and that’s excluding civil violations and speeding). And while misdemeanor charges may sound like small potatoes, they carry serious financial, personal, and social costs, especially for defendants but also for broader society, which finances the enforcement of these minor violations, the processing of these court cases, and all of the unnecessary incarceration that comes with them.

 

4. Policing criminal law violations costs taxpayers over $63 billion each year.

large circle showing the relative size of police expenditures to other costs of mass incarceration from the following the money of mass incarceration report. Policing costs the public $126.4 billion per year, nationwide. In our report about the fiscal costs of mass incarceration to the government and families of justice-involved people, we used only half of that figure – $63.2 billion – because only about half of police work is devoted to criminal law enforcement. The other half is spent on things unrelated to criminal law violations, such as traffic control, responding to civil disputes, and administration. Even at half the total cost of policing, $63.2 billion represents a huge public investment in criminalization. As many Americans are questioning the role of police in society, they should know just how much money is available to redirect to more humane community-based responses to social problems.

 

5. People who are Black and/or poor are more likely to be arrested, and to be arrested repeatedly.

chart comparing the percentage unemployed, the percentage with no high school diploma, and the percentage with an annual income below $10,000 among people with zero, one, or two or more arrests in one year. Unemployment, lack of diploma, and poverty are all much higher among people with multiple arrests. People who are arrested and jailed are often among the most socially and economically marginalized in society. The overrepresentation of Black men and women among people who are arrested is largely reflective of persistent residential segregation and racial profiling, which subject Black individuals and communities to greater surveillance and increased likelihood of police stops and searches. Poverty, unemployment, and educational exclusion are also factors strongly correlated with likelihood of arrest.

 

6. People with mental illnesses or substance use disorders are also more likely to be arrested, and to be arrested repeatedly.

chart comparing health needs among people arrested and booked zero, one, or two or more times in one year. Over a quarter of people arrested multiple times had a serious or moderate mental illness, serious psychological distress, and/or no health insurance. Over half had a substance use disorder. People who are arrested often have serious health needs that cannot and should not be addressed through policing or incarceration. Even a few days in jail can be devastating for people with serious mental health and medical needs, as they are cut off from their medications, support systems, and regular healthcare providers. Even worse, many people are arrested in the midst of a health crisis, such as mental distress or substance use withdrawal. History has shown that jails are unable to provide effective mental health and medical care to incarcerated people, and too often, jailing people with serious health problems has lethal consequences.

 

7. Women make up a growing share of arrests and report much more use of force than they did 20 years ago, with Black women most likely to be targeted.

chart comparing the increase in police use of force reported by men and women from 1999 to 2015. The number of men experiencing use of force doubled, while the number of women experiencing use of force more than quadrupled. The experiences of women and girls – especially Black women and other women of color – are often lost in the national conversation about policing. But of course women, too, are subject to racial profiling, use of excessive force, and any number of violations of their rights and dignity by police. Our analysis of national data shows that women now make up over a quarter of all arrests, with an estimated 2.8 million arrests in 2018. At the same time, the use of force has become much more common among women: the number of women who experienced police use of force (about 250,000) was 3.5 times greater in 2015 compared to 1999.

A closer examination of the data also reveals racial disparities in police stops, arrests, and use of force involving women. Black women are more likely than white or Latina women to be stopped while driving, and Black women are arrested 3 times as often as white women and twice as often as Latinas during police stops. Black women also report experiencing police use of force at higher rates than white or Latina women. With an estimated 12 million women per year experiencing police-initiated encounters – many of which involve searches, use of force, and other traumatizing experiences – the harms of policing to women demand more attention.

 

8. Disabled people represent a disproportionate number of those stopped, arrested, and killed by police.

As the ACLU of Southern California and the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law report, many criminalized behaviors targeted by law enforcement are related to disability: substance use (often used as self-medication for pain and other symptoms), homelessness (an estimated 78% of people in shelters have a disability), and atypical reactions to social cues, which may be interpreted as vaguely defined crimes such as “disorderly conduct.” The Ruderman Foundation reports that in police use-of-force incidents, the media and police often blame disabled people for their own victimization, especially by characterizing disabled people of color as “threatening” and “refusing to comply.”

The frequent use of police as first responders to individuals in crisis only compounds these problems. Too often, officers who are called to help individuals get medical treatment end up shooting them instead. Public funds should be redirected to community health providers to handle mental and physical health crises, rather than trying to meet this critical need with militarized police forces, who sometimes receive little training on crisis response or de-escalation.

 

9. Police treat Black Americans with less respect.

A Stanford University analysis of police bodycam footage from nearly 1,000 vehicle stops substantiates what Black Americans already know: police officers treat Black people differently than they do whites. This study, discussed in our briefing, finds that “police officers speak significantly less respectfully to black than to white community members in everyday traffic stops,” and that this happens irrespective of officer race, severity of the infraction, and outcome of the stop. These findings lend important context to the racial disparities observed in police encounters.

 

10. State and federal law enforcement practices target poor Black and Latinx residents.

Separate reports focusing on policing in Chicago highlighted two law enforcement strategies justified as ways to protect communities – drug stings and asset forfeiture – that facilitate widespread targeting of low-income communities of color. Federal agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) arranged drug stings that set up fake drug stash houses and lured people into committing new crimes. But they didn’t single out just anyone: At least 91% of the time, agents targeted Black and Latinx people. Columbia professor Jeffrey Fagan’s analysis found no statistical explanation for this except disparate racial treatment. A District Court judge described these cases as “ensnaring chronically unemployed individuals from poverty-ridden areas.”

Meanwhile, Cook County police conducted 23,000 seizures of assets connected to civil and criminal cases, a practice that is supposed to disrupt major illegal drug trades. But an analysis by Reason and the Lucy Parsons Lab showed that police officers were often taking petty property and the lowest-value seizures (valued under $100) were clustered in predominantly poor and Black communities on Chicago’s South and West Sides. These examples illustrate that at every level, the “war on drugs” functions as a war on communities of color.

 

For more information, the reports and briefings summarized here – and more – can be found on our Policing Issue page.

Acknowledgements: This briefing was compiled by Wendy Sawyer based on previously published writing by current staffers Wanda Bertram, Alexi Jones, Wendy Sawyer, and by Policy Initiative alumns Joshua Aiken, Alex Clark, Lucius Couloute, and Elliot Oberholtzer.


With help from artist Kevin Pyle, we explain why very few people who apply for compassionate release are approved — even during a pandemic.

by Emily Widra and Wanda Bertram, May 29, 2020

With the coronavirus pandemic threatening to turn prison sentences into death sentences, many incarcerated people are seeking compassionate release — the release of people who are facing imminent death and who pose no threat to the public — to save them from dying of COVID-19 in prison. Unfortunately, what they, and the American public, are learning is that compassionate release is not a transparent and linear process, but an unpredictably ordered series of obstacles. As artist Kevin Pyle depicts here, these hurdles and delays kill the vast majority of compassionate release petitions:

Artwork by Kevin Pyle showing the complicated maze of steps required for incarcerated people to apply for compassionate release resulting in only 6% of applications being approved, while the other 94% applicants are left to die in prison. Analysis based on federal Bureau of Prisons data, no state data available.

Applying for compassionate release is a lengthy and cumbersome process. Given that those who apply are almost always terminally ill or profoundly incapacitated, the arbitrary nature of this process means many die before their cases are resolved.1

The compassionate release process varies tremendously between states (some states even give it a different name, like “medical parole,” “geriatric parole”, etc.),2 but the basic framework is the same: An incarcerated person is recommended3 for release on compassionate grounds to prison administrators, who then solicit a medical recommendation, and then administrators or members of the parole board approve or deny compassionate release. Some states allow only family and attorneys to recommend that someone be released on these grounds; others allow incarcerated individuals to apply on their own behalf, or allow prison personnel to do so.

Compassionate release programs are plagued by many shortcomings, including:

  • Requirements that a person be extremely close to death, or so incapacitated that they do not understand why they are being punished.4
  • Requiring medical professionals to attest that someone is within six months, or nine months, of death. Health professionals are reluctant to give such exact prognoses, which means prison officials will default to saying “it’s safer just to not let this person go.”5
  • Allowing the ultimate decision-makers6 to overrule recommendations from medical professionals and prison staff (e.g. by refuting or ignoring a medical prognosis).

The compassionate release process is frustratingly obscure not only for applicants, but for reporters, advocates, and others trying to understand the system. In their national survey, FAMM found that only three states are required to publish data on compassionate release grants, and eight other states publish some publicly available data, leaving most Americans in the dark about how often compassionate release is actually used. And despite that fact that FAMM has helpful memos for all fifty states and the District of Columbia detailing eligibility requirements for compassionate release, the application and referral process, the necessary documentation and assessments, and the decision-making criteria, the application process remains an arduous one.

There is plenty of room for states to improve their compassionate release processes. In our 2018 report Eight Keys to Mercy, we recommended that states:

  • Make compassionate release available to all incarcerated people, irrespective of the offenses for which they are incarcerated.
  • Streamline all compassionate release processes and set reachable deadlines so that petitioners don’t die due to bureaucratic bottlenecks before they are released.
  • Limit the ability of prison officials to overrule, on medical grounds, a recommendation of release by medical professionals.

But even when a compassionate release system operates efficiently and fairly, the majority of people in prison are still not eligible for it. As currently constituted, these programs exclude too many people and these systems were never designed for quick responses during a global pandemic. States need to look beyond compassionate release — including expedited parole, and mass commutations — to slow the spread of the pandemic and prevent a needless tragedy behind bars.

Footnotes

  1. According to the New York Times, between 2013 and 2017, the federal Bureau of Prisons approved only 6% of the 5,400 compassionate release applications received; meanwhile, 266 other applicants died in prison. Their analysis of federal prison data shows that it takes over six months, on average, for an incarcerated person to receive an answer on their compassionate release application from the BOP. In one tragic example, prison officials denied an application for someone because the BOP put aside prison doctors’ prognosis of less than six months and concluded that he had more than 18 months to live, despite. Two days after receiving the denial, he died.  ↩
  2. FAMM’s national survey found that not all states use the term “compassionate release” and instead refer to these programs as medical and geriatric parole, short- and long-term furloughs, suspension or reduction of sentences, and executive clemency on medical grounds.  ↩
  3. There are major differences between state policies, but for a more comprehensive view of state policies, go to FAMM’s detailed breakdown on state practices in their 2018 report.  ↩
  4. In Hawai’i, being “too ill or cognitively impaired to participate in rehabilitation and/or to be aware of punishment” can qualify someone for consideration for release on medical grounds.  ↩
  5. In a uniquely positive development, new guidelines for federal prisons issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission do not require a short-term “terminal” prognosis, as an excellent article in Health Affairs points out.  ↩
  6. The “ultimate decision-makers” vary greatly by jurisdiction. For example, in the federal system, the prison warden makes a recommendation, but the final word on compassionate release comes from the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons. In other jurisdictions, courts have the final say on compassionate release: in D.C., decisions are made in the superior court, and in Ohio the sentencing court rules on compassionate release. The Department of Corrections’ commissioner makes the decision in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Mississippi (in Mississippi, the decision is made jointly with the Chief Medical Officer). In Arizona, Virginia, and West Virginia, the governor decides who is granted compassionate release after hearing a recommendation from the parole board. Many states rely on the parole board to make compassionate release decisions, including Alabama, California, and North Carolina. For the decision makers in every state, see FAMM’s state-specific memos.  ↩

Parole boards are granting parole contingent on participation in programs that are often not readily available for people behind bars, especially during the pandemic.

by Emily Widra and Wendy Sawyer, May 21, 2020

With public health officials and criminal justice reform advocates urging prisons to reduce their populations, people who have already been approved for release should be the first to return to their communities and families. Instead, thousands of them are waiting behind bars — where social distancing is impossible — as prisons across the country become the epicenters of the COVID-19 pandemic.

These are the people who have already been granted parole by the state parole boards, but have not yet taken a class or program that the parole board requires them to complete before they can go home. They are near enough to the end of their sentences to be parole-eligible, and the parole board has determined that they are “safe” to return to the community, but they cannot be released until they complete a program, often a drug and alcohol treatment program.

timeline showing that after being granted parole, people remain in prison waiting to participated in mandated programming Parole boards are granting parole contingent on participation in programs that are often not readily available for people behind bars. If states changed their policies to allow for these programs to occur in the community upon re-entry, they would see the prison population drop without making any other significant release policy changes. Studies show that, at least for the therapeutic community model used in many prison systems, there is nothing unique to the prison context that makes these programs more effective than when they are done in the community.

Tennessee offers a striking example of this potentially devastating policy failure. Over 1,300 COVID-19 cases in Tennessee are connected to a single state prison — Trousdale Turner Correctional Center — making it the third largest source of COVID-19 cases in the country. As Nashville defense attorney David Raybin explained to NewsChannel5, over 1,000 people in Tennessee prisons have been approved for parole but are waiting to participate in the mandated programming, most often the Department of Correction’s therapeutic community program, which lasts 9-12 months. That means Tennessee could reduce its prison population by almost 4% by releasing just those who have already been approved for parole.1

Evidence shows that these programs are effective whether offered before or after release, but states have been reluctant to offer these programs in communities instead of in prisons. But of course, education and treatment programming across the nation’s prison systems have been interrupted by the virus, as volunteers and educators are no longer entering the prison system on a regular basis; in Tennessee, the Department of Correction released a statement that the virus is causing “some disruption in programming.” Even in the best of times, participation in these programs is limited and people wait behind bars for a space in the program before they can be released.

This is not a new problem for Tennessee. Before the pandemic, a taskforce commissioned by the governor found that 40% of people granted parole from 2015-2019 had not actually been released because they were still waiting to participate in pre-release programs mandated by the parole board. That means that over those four years, more than 6,000 people were parole-eligible, reviewed and approved for release by the parole board, and then remained in prison simply because the mandated program was not offered at their facility or the maximum number of participants had already been reached.

Where did this problem come from?

Every state is different, but in Tennessee and some other states, the parole board appears to decide the criteria for someone’s release, while the prison system runs the classes and decides who is eligible to take them. Governors and state legislators need to be aware that these two parts of the criminal justice system are working against each other and against public health.

Nor is this problem unique to Tennessee. A 2015 survey by the Robina Institute revealed that at least 40 states use “institutional program participation” as a factor in release decision-making for parole. In Texas, families have voiced their concern about loved ones who have been granted parole, but are still waiting to complete a pre-release program. Officials report that people often wait for months after being granted parole to begin these programs that provide education, life skills and employment training, substance abuse treatment, and other important re-entry supports. But waiting for programming that is on-hold or indefinitely postponed is no reason for people to remain in prison, especially when incarceration puts them at a heightened risk for contracting the virus.

If parole boards do not change this practice, for as long as the virus causes a “disruption in programming,” the number of people approved for parole but still in prison will continue to grow. The solution is obvious: Parole boards can waive the requirement or offer the therapeutic community programming after release. Especially given the current public health crisis, it makes sense for these programs — which, again, have been shown to be effective when offered after release — to be moved to the community setting when it is safe to do so. And in the meantime, people who have been approved for parole should be released as quickly as possible as part of the state’s efforts to protect incarcerated people and the larger community.

The Prison Policy Initiative is exploring doing a larger project evaluating prison programming, particularly the programming used to make parole decisions. If you happen to have copies of the curricula for any programs run in your state, please send a copy to virusresponse@prisonpolicy.org.

Footnotes

  1. Tennessee’s total prison population on March 31st, 2020 was 26,124, according to the Vera Institute of Justice’s recent report, People in Prison 2019, so releasing 1,000 people would be a 4% reduction.  ↩

Our updated analysis finds that jails are responding to the unprecedented public health crisis by rapidly dropping their populations. In contrast, state prisons have barely budged.

by Emily Widra and Peter Wagner, May 14, 2020

This article was updated on October 21st, 2021 with more recent jail and prison population data. That version should be used instead of this one.

In the last two months, local governments across the U.S. have drastically reduced their jail populations to slow the spread of the coronavirus. The typical jail has reduced its population by more than 30%. But state prisons — where social distancing is just as impossible as in jails, and correctional staff still move in and out every day — have been much slower to release incarcerated people: The typical prison system has reduced its population by only 5%. Below, we compare the population cuts in local jails to those in state prisons, discussing just how little states are doing to keep their residents (and the general public) safe. (And note, our use of the term “reduction” is a purposeful distinction from “release,” as we have found that there are multiple mechanisms impacting populations, of which releases are but one part.)

graph comparing jail population reductions to those of prisons in the time of coronavirus. While jails continue to make quick changes in the face of the pandemic, they house only 1/3rd of the incarcerated population, while the other two-thirds are held by state and federal authorities, who are moving far too slowly. After North Dakota, the six states with the largest reductions share an important quirk: they are all small state prison systems that serve as both prisons and jails. For that reason, much of their reduction could be the result of drops in the jail portion of their populations and it is possible that the reduction of their sentenced prison population may be much smaller. The one exception is Connecticut, which after the previous version of this report sent us data showing that their pretrial population decreased 10% and their sentenced population decreased by 11% from March 1st to April 29. (For detailed data on 131 large jails, see Table 1 below and for the data on more than 600 jails see our appendix, and for the smaller changes in 41 state prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons, see Table 2 below.)

The strategies jails are using to reduce their populations vary by location, but they add up to big changes. In some counties, police are issuing citations in lieu of arrests, prosecutors are declining to charge people for “low-level offenses,” courts are reducing the amounts of cash bail, and jail administrators are releasing people detained pretrial or those serving short sentences for “nonviolent offenses.” (We’re tracking news stories and official announcements of the most important changes in the country on our virus response page.)

Table 1: Largest known population reductions in large local jails

Table 1. Most large jails have reduced their detained population by at least 25% in response to the pandemic, and many jails have gone much further. (And for jails of all sizes with available data, the median population reduction is 32%.) (This table is based on the daily populations of 607 jails collected by the NYU Public Safety Lab, and then filtered to show only 131 large jails — with a pre-pandemic population of at least 350 people — and those that had available population counts that pre-date the start of the pandemic. Our analysis excludes jails whose population counts were not collected prior to the pandemic because we did not want to under-report the scale of the population reductions in jails that took early decisive action. We excluded smaller jails from this table because small population variations in smaller jails can look more significant than they are. However, in the aggregate, smaller jails appear to be reducing their populations even more than larger jails because the median jail reduction for jails of all sizes is 32%. Subsequent versions of this briefing will experiment with calculating jail population reductions using a rolling 7-day average as a way to minimize the need to discuss large and small jails separately. For the data on all 607 jails with available data, see the appendix.
County jail State Percentage reduction Pre-COVID-19 jail population (large jails 350 or more people) Most recent jail population Pre-COVID date Most recent date
Clackamas OR 63% 403 148 1/27/20 5/12/20
Faulkner AR 58% 433 180 1/1/20 5/12/20
Bergen NJ 57% 573 248 1/31/20 5/12/20
Snohomish WA 55% 786 350 1/1/20 5/12/20
Scott IA 52% 464 224 2/11/20 5/11/20
Kenton KY 52% 722 350 1/29/20 5/11/20
Washington AR 49% 714 362 1/1/20 5/12/20
Pulaski KY 48% 371 192 1/29/20 4/30/20
Washington OR 48% 881 461 2/28/20 5/12/20
Jefferson CO 46% 1243 673 1/28/20 5/12/20
Rowan NC 46% 373 203 2/26/20 5/12/20
Yakima WA 46% 843 459 2/27/20 5/12/20
Cabarrus NC 45% 360 197 2/11/20 5/12/20
Yuba CA 43% 394 224 2/3/20 5/12/20
Polk IA 43% 876 503 1/1/20 5/12/20
Spalding GA 42% 409 236 2/26/20 4/29/20
Davidson NC 42% 368 215 1/7/20 5/12/20
Arapahoe CO 41% 1183 696 1/1/20 5/12/20
York SC 41% 421 250 2/18/20 5/12/20
San Juan NM 39% 458 278 1/1/20 5/12/20
Salt Lake UT 39% 2089 1268 1/31/20 5/12/20
Henderson KY 39% 439 268 2/11/20 5/12/20
Floyd GA 38% 678 418 1/29/20 4/14/20
McCracken KY 38% 567 350 2/11/20 5/11/20
Boulder CO 38% 602 372 1/1/20 5/12/20
Carroll GA 38% 464 287 2/6/20 4/20/20
Benton AR 38% 710 441 2/11/20 5/12/20
Clermont OH 37% 392 248 1/1/20 5/12/20
Lexington SC 37% 499 316 2/11/20 5/12/20
Putnam TN 37% 366 232 2/3/20 5/12/20
Bulloch GA 36% 376 240 2/21/20 5/8/20
Gaston NC 35% 631 407 1/30/20 5/12/20
Anderson SC 35% 410 265 2/27/20 5/11/20
Lafayette LA 35% 936 605 1/1/20 5/12/20
Hamilton OH 35% 1532 991 1/30/20 5/12/20
Berkeley SC 35% 511 332 1/1/20 5/12/20
Knox TN 35% 1415 920 1/28/20 5/12/20
Minnehaha SD 34% 504 332 1/1/20 5/12/20
Lafourche LA 33% 458 309 1/1/20 5/12/20
Daviess KY 32% 704 476 1/29/20 5/8/20
Shawnee KS 32% 530 360 1/28/20 5/12/20
Blount TN 32% 537 365 2/26/20 5/12/20
Baldwin AL 32% 559 380 2/28/20 5/12/20
Buncombe NC 32% 525 358 1/28/20 5/4/20
Kane IL 32% 489 334 1/21/20 5/12/20
St Joseph IN 32% 613 419 1/29/20 5/5/20
Racine WI 31% 753 517 2/28/20 5/12/20
Ellis TX 31% 410 282 1/25/20 5/12/20
Chatham NC 30% 1743 1213 2/2/20 5/6/20
Worcester MA 30% 753 529 2/11/20 4/28/20
Marion OR 29% 414 292 1/9/20 5/12/20
Galveston TX 29% 1002 707 1/28/20 5/12/20
Christian KY 29% 759 536 1/30/20 5/12/20
Houston AL 29% 361 257 1/23/20 5/12/20
Campbell KY 29% 604 430 2/11/20 5/11/20
Lancaster NE 27% 606 440 2/11/20 5/11/20
Tulare CA 27% 1548 1125 2/11/20 5/12/20
Cumberland ME 27% 354 258 1/1/20 5/12/20
Tippecanoe IN 27% 490 359 2/28/20 5/12/20
Franklin OH 26% 1923 1420 1/1/20 5/12/20
Monroe FL 26% 507 375 1/7/20 5/12/20
Spartanburg SC 26% 742 549 2/11/20 5/12/20
Bell TX 25% 857 639 1/1/20 5/12/20
Norfolk VA 25% 961 720 1/31/20 5/12/20
Bonneville ID 25% 376 282 1/1/20 5/12/20
Pamunkey VA 25% 361 271 2/11/20 5/12/20
New Hanover NC 24% 454 343 1/28/20 5/12/20
Terrebonne LA 24% 647 491 1/28/20 5/12/20
Milwaukee WI 24% 1890 1441 1/1/20 5/12/20
Guilford NC 24% 1060 809 2/11/20 4/29/20
Tangipahoa LA 23% 587 452 2/19/20 5/12/20
Boone KY 22% 427 331 1/1/20 5/12/20
Will IL 22% 739 573 1/27/20 5/12/20
Blue Ridge Lynchburg VA 22% 492 382 2/11/20 5/11/20
Warren KY 22% 684 532 2/29/20 5/12/20
Fulton KY 22% 497 387 1/29/20 5/11/20
Bernalillo NM 22% 1573 1227 1/1/20 5/12/20
Hopkins KY 22% 397 310 1/29/20 5/11/20
Tom Green TX 21% 438 344 1/1/20 5/12/20
Kenosha WI 21% 533 419 2/16/20 5/12/20
El Dorado CA 21% 389 306 1/21/20 5/12/20
Dauphin PA 21% 1121 882 1/1/20 5/12/20
Virginia Beach VA 20% 1486 1188 1/31/20 5/12/20
Ouachita LA 20% 1173 940 2/15/20 5/12/20
Walton FL 18% 471 385 1/1/20 5/12/20
Canyon ID 18% 420 345 1/1/20 5/6/20
Iberia LA 17% 409 338 1/28/20 5/12/20
Yavapai AZ 17% 473 391 1/1/20 5/12/20
Santa Rosa FL 17% 681 563 2/4/20 4/2/20
Avoyelles LA 17% 424 351 2/11/20 5/12/20
Sumter FL 17% 442 366 1/28/20 5/7/20
Franklin LA 17% 833 690 1/1/20 5/12/20
Richland LA 17% 755 626 1/29/20 5/12/20
Lancaster PA 17% 781 650 2/11/20 5/12/20
Monroe NY 17% 758 631 2/28/20 5/12/20
Shasta CA 17% 466 388 2/11/20 5/12/20
Stanislaus CA 17% 1305 1088 2/5/20 5/12/20
Riverside VA 17% 1368 1141 1/25/20 5/12/20
Middle River VA 17% 884 738 1/31/20 5/12/20
Prince Georges MD 16% 848 709 1/1/20 5/12/20
Aiken SC 16% 631 529 2/26/20 5/12/20
Shelby TN 16% 1819 1527 1/1/20 5/12/20
Wake NC 16% 1288 1082 2/11/20 5/12/20
Webster LA 16% 668 562 2/19/20 5/11/20
Claiborne LA 16% 581 489 1/1/20 5/12/20
Rapides LA 16% 875 737 1/31/20 5/12/20
Pike KY 16% 400 337 1/29/20 5/12/20
Escambia FL 14% 1450 1241 2/28/20 5/12/20
Kemper MS 14% 381 327 1/1/20 5/12/20
Brown WI 14% 721 619 1/31/20 5/11/20
St Charles LA 14% 469 403 1/28/20 5/12/20
Western Virginia VA 14% 880 757 1/25/20 5/12/20
Wayne MI 13% 2069 1800 1/1/20 5/12/20
Sarasota FL 13% 883 772 1/30/20 5/12/20
Alachua FL 12% 690 607 1/1/20 5/12/20
Jackson MO 12% 737 649 1/1/20 5/12/20
Morehouse LA 12% 484 427 1/29/20 5/12/20
Caldwell LA 11% 612 543 2/19/20 5/12/20
Randall TX 11% 389 347 2/22/20 5/12/20
Morgan AL 9% 600 547 2/26/20 5/12/20
Morgan TN 9% 600 547 2/26/20 5/12/20
Broward FL 8% 1685 1542 1/1/20 5/12/20
St Lucie FL 7% 1291 1196 1/30/20 5/12/20
Lubbock TX 7% 1243 1155 1/28/20 5/6/20
Meherrin River VA 7% 421 392 2/11/20 5/12/20
Comanche OK 4% 358 343 2/11/20 5/12/20
Clay FL 4% 397 381 1/30/20 5/12/20
Yazoo MS 3% 553 538 1/29/20 4/24/20
St Johns FL 1% 412 406 1/28/20 5/12/20
Ector TX 0% 592 592 2/21/20 5/12/20
Yuma AZ increased by 7% 356 381 1/1/20 5/12/20

Meanwhile, state Departments of Correction have been announcing plans to reduce their prison populations — by halting new admissions from county jails, increasing commutations, and releasing people who are medically fragile, elderly, or nearing the end of their sentences — but our analysis finds that the resulting population changes have been small.

Table 2: Most state prison systems show only very modest population reductions (showing 41 states — and the Federal Bureau of Prisons — where the data was readily available)

Table 2. The Vera Institute of Justice has collected and made available for this report the pre-pandemic population counts (as of December 31st, 2019) and current (as of late April/early May) counts for 41 state prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons. For information about the most important policy changes announced in the states that made these small reductions possible, see our COVID-19 response tracker. *Importantly, there are six states with small state prison systems that serve as both prisons and jails.
State Percentage reduction Pre-COVID-19 prison population Most recent prison population
North Dakota 19% 1,794 1,461
Hawaii* 18% 5,179 4,260
Vermont* 15% 1,608 1,369
Rhode Island* 13% 2,740 2,395
Alaska* 11% 4,475 3,985
Connecticut* 11% 12,293 10,973
Delaware* 11% 5,692 5,081
Utah 10% 6,731 6,064
Oregon 9% 15,755 14,355
Kentucky 9% 23,436 21,397
New York 8% 44,284 40,956
Colorado 7% 19,714 18,419
Nevada 6% 12,942 12,127
Louisiana 6% 31,609 29,682
New Jersey 6% 18,613 17,519
Wisconsin 5% 23,956 22,681
Massachusetts 5% 8,205 7,778
North Carolina 5% 34,510 32,795
California 5% 125,507 119,327
Texas 5% 158,820 151,126
Mississippi 5% 19,469 18,553
Pennsylvania 4% 45,875 43,852
Idaho 4% 9,437 9,028
Kansas 4% 10,177 9,740
New Hampshire 4% 2,622 2,513
Iowa 4% 9,282 8,899
Alabama 4% 28,266 27,164
Maine 4% 2,205 2,123
West Virginia 4% 6,800 6,550
Florida 4% 96,009 92,574
Missouri 3% 26,044 25,133
Georgia 3% 55,556 53,648
BOP 3% 175,116 169,426
Oklahoma 3% 25,712 24,947
Michigan 3% 38,053 36,980
Ohio 3% 49,762 48,453
Arizona 2% 42,441 41,386
Arkansas 2% 17,759 17,331
South Carolina 2% 18,608 18,160
Indiana 2% 27,268 26,707
Nebraska 2% 5,651 5,537
Wyoming 1% 2,479 2,465

Some states’ prison population cuts are even less significant than they initially appear, because the states achieved those cuts partially by refusing to admit people from county jails. (At least Colorado, Illinois, California, and Oklahoma are doing this.) While refusing to admit people from jails does reduce prison density, it means that the people who would normally be admitted are still being held in different correctional facilities.

Other states are indeed transferring people in prison to outside the system, either to parole or to home confinement, but these releases have not amounted to significant population reductions. For example, the Iowa Department of Corrections has released over 800 people nearing the end of their sentences since March 1st, but the overall net change in Iowa’s incarcerated population has only been about 4%. Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear commuted the sentences of almost 200 people convicted of felonies in early April, and the state also planned to release 743 people within 6 months of completing their sentences. Since December 2019, the Kentucky prison population has only decreased by a net 9%, while more than 85% of the jails we analyzed had dropped their populations by 10% or more.

Of the states we analyzed, those with smaller pre-pandemic prison populations appeared to have reduced their populations the most drastically. The prison population has dropped by 19% in North Dakota, the same state that we found to have the most comprehensive and realistic COVID-19 mitigation plan in our April 2020 survey. North Dakota has done more to reduce its state prison population than any other state, but even that state has done less than the typical jail in the country which has reduced its population by more than 30%.

States clearly need to do more to reduce the density of state prisons. For the most part, states are not even taking the simplest and least controversial steps, like refusing admissions for technical violations of probation and parole rules, and to release those that are already in confinement for those same technical violations. (In 2016, 60,000 people were returned to state prison for behaviors that, for someone not on probation or parole, would not be a crime.) Similarly, other obvious places to start are releasing people nearing the end of their sentence, those who are in minimum security facilities and on work-release, and those who are medically fragile or older.

If the leadership and success of local jails in reducing their populations isn’t enough of an example for state level officials, they may find some inspiration in the comparative success of other countries:

Table 3: Countries reducing their incarcerated populations in the face of the pandemic (showing 13 countries where current population data was readily available)

Table 3. The United States incarcerates more people than any other country, and all U.S. states incarcerate at higher rates than most countries. Countries around the world are recognizing that public safety includes protecting society from the unnecessary spread of COVID-19, and are reducing their prison populations in order to meet that goal. (Release counts collected by Prison Policy Initiative from news stories covering international prison and jail releases. Percentage of reductions calculated by the Prison Policy Initiative based on pre-pandemic populations — including pretrial and remand detainees — from the World Prison Brief.)
Country Percentage reduction Pre-COVID-19 prison population Number released Pre-COVID date Date of releases
Afghanistan 33% 30,748 10,000 2018 3/26/20
Turkey 31% 286,000 90,000 2019 4/14/20
Iran 29% 240,000 70,000 2018 3/17/20
Myanmar 26% 92,000 24,000 2018 4/17/20
South Sudan 20% 7,000 1,400 2019 4/20/20
The Gambia 17% 691 115 2019 4/26/20
Indonesia 14% 270,387 38,000 3/31/20 4/20/20
France 14% 72,000 10,000 3/2020 4/15/20
Ireland 13% 3,893 503 2018 4/22/20
Italy 11% 61,230 6,500 2/29/20 4/26/20
Kenya 9% 51,130 4,500 2018 4/17/20
Colombia 8% 122,085 10,000 2/29/20 3/31/20
Britain 5% 83,189 4,000 3/27/20 4/4/20

Prisons and jails are notoriously dangerous places during a viral outbreak, and public health professionals, corrections officials, and criminal justice reform advocates agree that decarceration will help protect both incarcerated people and the larger communities in which they live. It’s past time for U.S. prison systems to meaningfully address the crisis at hand and reduce the number of people behind bars.

This article updates one published on May 1st with a larger dataset of state prison population reductions collected by the Vera Institute of Justice and released alongside their report Prisoners in 2019, and with updated jail reduction figures collected by the NYU Public Safety Lab.


Our table shows that more than 10% of people incarcerated in state prisons are 55 or older - and in some states, like Montana, the percentage is much higher.

by Emily Widra, May 11, 2020

This briefing has been updated to a new version with data through 2021.

Prisons and jails have become the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic, with seven of the ten largest hotspots identified as state prisons and local jails. With the CDC having warned that older adults are at heightened risk for severe complications and death from COVID-19, readers have asked us: Just how many people in state prisons are older adults? We’ve answered this question — state by state — in a handy table below.

To prepare our table, we drew on the most recent age data from the National Corrections Reporting Program, 1991-2015. Age data for state prisons is broken down into categories, and older adults fall into the category of “55 and older.” Although outside of correctional facilities, the term “older adults” often refers to people 65 and older, incarceration itself shortens life expectancy and hastens physiological aging. So for the purposes of addressing how vulnerable different groups are to the coronavirus, it makes sense to consider adults 55 and older behind bars as “older adults.”

We found that, on average, more than 10% of people in state prisons are over the age of 55. Some state prison systems have much higher percentages of older adults, like in Montana, where over 17% of the state prison population is 55 years or older.

Regardless of their preexisting health conditions, all older adults are at greater risk for complications from COVID-19. As this virus threatens to turn their prison sentences into death sentences, states should use all possible strategies to release them to the care of their families.

The percentage and count of state prison population that is 55 and older, as well as total prison population, by state for the most recent year possible. Compiled by Prison Policy Initiative from National Corrections Reporting Program, 1991-2015 using year-end populations. For the number and percent of state prison populations 55 and older over time (1999-2015), see our spreadsheet, Percent of prison populations 55 and older, by state, 2013-2015 [xlsx].
State Percent 55 and older Count 55 and older Total population Year
Ala. 12.33% 3,266 26,487 2015
Alaska 10.48% 397 3,597 2014
Ariz. 9.38% 3,971 42,352 2015
Ark. 11.08% 1,734 15,647 2015
Calif. 13.07% 16,826 128,717 2015
Colo. 11.30% 2,191 19,394 2015
Conn. 7.91% 898 11,359 2015
D.C. 10.53% 641 5,414 2014
Del. 10.90% 568 5,210 2015
Fla. 12.91% 12,848 99,532 2015
Ga. 10.95% 5,717 52,188 2015
Hawaii 11.31% 669 5,917 2015
Idaho 10.74% 781 7,270 2015
Ill. 7.76% 4,041 48,159 2014
Ind. 8.72% 2,401 27,535 2015
Iowa 10.06% 944 9,388 2015
Kans. 10.92% 1,070 9,795 2015
Ky. 7.90% 1,729 21,877 2015
La. 11.51% 4,079 35,434 2015
Maine 10.81% 241 2,230 2015
Mass. 15.23% 1,391 9,134 2015
Md. 9.21% 1,850 20,095 2015
Mich. 11.66% 5,032 43,171 2013
Minn. 7.83% 795 10,153 2015
Miss. 9.43% 1,758 18,648 2015
Mo. 10.89% 3,447 31,666 2015
Mont. 17.34% 439 2,531 2015
N. Dak. 7.33% 126 1,720 2014
N. Mex. 9.51% 684 7,195 2015
N.C. 10.81% 3,947 36,524 2015
N.H. 14.86% 402 2,705 2015
N.J. 9.34% 2,021 21,638 2015
N.Y. 10.37% 5,289 50,992 2015
Nebr. 10.12% 535 5,289 2015
Nev. 12.36% 1,644 13,299 2015
Ohio 10.96% 5,969 54,455 2015
Okla. 10.68% 3,115 29,156 2015
Oreg. 12.11% 1,757 14,503 2014
Pa. 12.10% 6,049 50,005 2015
R.I. 9.45% 253 2,678 2015
S. Dak. 10.03% 345 3,441 2015
S.C. 10.29% 2,190 21,288 2015
Tenn. 8.87% 2,749 30,978 2015
Tex. 11.59% 17,456 150,627 2015
Utah 10.24% 647 6,318 2015
Va. 11.21% 4,106 36,631 2015
Vt. 10.61% 177 1,668 2015
W. Va. 11.98% 777 6,487 2015
Wash. 11.20% 1,967 17,560 2015
Wis. 10.48% 2,379 22,695 2015
Wyo. 12.81% 309 2,413 2015

Our fact sheet for advocates shows how rapidly the coronavirus can spread through correctional facilities, and how high infection rates in prisons and jails already are.

by Wendy Sawyer, May 8, 2020

To help advocates argue for more aggressive decarceration as COVID-19 spreads rapidly through the nation’s prisons and jails, we’ve created a one page PDF fact sheet.

Factsheet thumbnail.

The fact sheet includes new analysis of recent COVID-19 data, largely gathered by the UCLA School of Law COVID-19 Behind Bars Data Project, put into context using other government data sources. As a result, we were able to make a series of tables and charts to show:

  • Prevalence rates of the virus in facilities that have conducted widespread testing;
  • How many asymptomatic people test positive in facilities with universal testing — indicating that in places where only the few people with symptoms are being tested, many more untested people are spreading the virus;
  • The largest outbreaks in jails and prisons where facilities are testing incarcerated people; and
  • The rapid spread of the virus over time in the few places that publish historical data, such as the Cook County (Chicago) jail and Arkansas prison system.

We also discuss the problems with prison and jail COVID-19 data; namely, that the data we have only reflect test results, and most places still are not testing widely. What we’ve learned from the places testing everyone — not just people showing symptoms — is that the virus is rampant among incarcerated people and correctional staff, which means that some prisons and jails are acting as “spreaders” of the virus in local communities.

The rapid spread of the virus among incarcerated people is unsurprising, since social distancing is impossible in the close quarters of prisons and jails. And incarcerated people, who disproportionately suffer from chronic illnesses that make them more vulnerable to the virus, are at incredible risk. As our new fact sheet shows, federal, state, and local authorities must freeze admissions and release more people now to prevent further spread of the virus through incarceration.


We review how federal courts are modifying their procedures in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.

by Wendy Sawyer, May 6, 2020

As we have argued recently, in order to prevent more unnecessary COVID-19 related deaths among incarcerated people, authorities must minimize the use of pretrial incarceration. In the case of local jails, “authorities” means a complex web of jurisdictions and officials who have the authority to release people from jail. The federal system is a different story. Unlike local jails, federal pretrial detention is governed by a single set of laws, but that doesn’t simplify matters much when the actual decision-makers are spread out among 94 judicial districts.

So what are federal courts doing to reduce pretrial incarceration? We looked at some of the orders that federal courts have issued to deal with pretrial populations during the COVID-19 pandemic, and identified some important issues, promising approaches, and places where more dramatic action is needed.

Judges are traditionally hesitant to involve themselves with carceral operations, given the central role of separation-of-powers in American governance. But pretrial detention is a special situation, since people who are not convicted are in the custody of the court, and judges must decide whether or not defendants should be incarcerated pending trial.

Every federal court in the country has issued general orders modifying their operations during the current pandemic. Dozens of these orders address the treatment of pretrial detainees, but most of these provisions are disappointing in their narrow scope: Many orders simply require screening of symptoms, or encourage the use of video appearances, but do nothing to actually address the public health crisis posed by incarceration during a viral pandemic. Most notably, many orders instruct the US Marshals Service (which operates federal pretrial detention) to develop procedures for monitoring the health of incarcerated people, despite the Marshals’ well-documented indifference to the health of the people in its custody.

However, a handful of court orders — ranging from generalized statements of goals to specific policy changes — stand out as actually addressing the problem, and are worthy of discussion:1

Statements of policy. On the more generalized end of the spectrum, Minnesota’s district court has entered an order directing its office of pretrial services to “reassess whether alternatives to detention exist that in its judgment will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community.” This approach is commendable, but without careful attention to the details, it runs the risk of widening the use of troublesome “alternatives” like electronic monitoring.

Protecting health one case at a time. In the middle of the spectrum of judicial responses are courts that have decided to make case-by-case decisions on pretrial detention, but have provided new procedures for speeding up the process. The federal court for Alaska has created an expedited procedure to rule on requests from people seeking release from custody prior to trial or sentencing, which includes a procedure for defendants to obtain their own medical records for use as evidence. The courts in Massachusetts and the Eastern District of Michigan have entered similar orders, with the Michigan court specifically noting the need to “reduc[e] population density in BOP and detention facilities.”

Anticipating how facilities may undermine justice. The federal court in Montana has recognized that social distancing measures will inevitably lead to more defendants being forced to communicate with their lawyers via phone or video. Accordingly, that court’s general order specifies that when that happens, “the attorney-client privilege…is not waived by the presence of third parties or the existence of monitoring.” Importantly, these protections apply whether or not facilities or phone companies advise callers that their communications are being monitored.

The court for the Eastern District of New York has taken the most comprehensive approach, by emphasizing the need for meaningful information on the conditions in facilities where people are held. The court has identified the four facilities that hold most pretrial defendants in the Eastern District, and has ordered the wardens of those facilities to provide twice-weekly reports on mitigation measures and test results. The court order goes on to direct that such reports be posted on the court’s public website.

As one can see from reading the reports submitted to the New York Court, they are sparse on details and use the bureaucratic jargon common among correctional administrators. Nonetheless, this reporting requirement is an important first step in combatting one of the pandemic’s most important drivers of fear: the lack of information.

As a currently incarcerated author noted in an article published last week, “The only way to significantly reduce inevitable deaths from an outbreak inside is to reduce the number of people inside.” While none of the court orders discussed here directly release anyone from custody, they highlight some of the issues that we will have to address when pushing for large-scale reductions in incarceration: facilitating judicial decision-making about releases, preserving privacy in an age of digital communications, and prying factual information out of correctional bureaucracies that are generally hostile to transparency.

Footnotes

  1. This is not to say that every court that hasn’t issued a general order on pretrial detention is failing to do something. Some courts may be addressing the issue informally, through robust case-by-case determinations, or through amendments to local rules. This briefing focuses on general orders because they are comparatively easy to locate.  ↩


Problems with data collection - and an unfortunate tendency to group Native Americans together with other ethnic and racial groups in data publications - have made it hard to understand the effect of mass incarceration on Native people.

by Roxanne Daniel, April 22, 2020

The scarcity of data on Native Americans in the U.S. criminal justice system comes up a lot in our conversations with activists and reporters, who rightly wonder why Native populations are often excluded from comparisons with other racial and ethnic groups. While Census data reveals that Native populations are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, other information that could shed more light on the issue is sparse. So, we compiled the information that does exist — which is fractured and hard to locate — in one place below.

Preface: What the Census data says

We’ve previously used data from the 2010 Census to analyze incarcerated populations by race/ethnicity and sex for each state. In our analysis, data on prisons and jails were combined. We found that, in 2010, there were a total of 37,854 American Indian/Alaskan Natives in adult correctional facilities, including 32,524 men and 5,132 women (and 198 who were 17 or younger). That is equivalent to a total incarceration rate of 1,291 per 100,000 people, more than double that of white Americans (510 per 100,000). In states with large Native populations, such as North Dakota, American Indian/Alaskan Native incarceration rates can be up to 7 times that of whites. Once the 2020 Census data is released, we will update our analysis, since it is 10 years old now.

Other data on Native Americans in the criminal justice system

Prisons: In 2016, 19,790 Native men and 2,954 Native women (22,744 total) were incarcerated in U.S. state and federal prisons, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) series. The NPS series reports the population of state and federal prisons – but not local jails – by race/ethnicity and sex, but the most recent data available with that level of detail is from 2016. However, other sources supplement these findings:

  • BJS reports an increase to 23,701, in Prisoners in 2017. Oklahoma tops the list as the state with the highest number of American Indian/Alaskan Natives incarcerated, followed by Arizona, Alaska, and California. However, this data is not broken down further by sex and race.
  • Limited state-level data is also available from some state Departments of Corrections, like Alaska’s, which identifies Alaskan Native populations in its annual Offender Profile. However, many other states, even those with large Native populations like California and Texas, group these populations into an “other” category when reporting demographics. (More on that in our discussion of data limitations below.)

Jails: The BJS annual report on jail inmates estimates 9,700 American Indian/Alaskan Native people – or 401 per 100,000 population – were held in local jails across the country as of late June, 2018. That’s almost twice the jail incarceration rates of both white and Hispanic people (187 and 185 per 100,000, respectively). Frustratingly, this data is also not reported by sex.

The 2016 BJS Jails in Indian Country report identifies 80 facilities operating on tribal lands, holding 2,540 people – 1,750 men and 620 women – in mid-2016. The number of inmates admitted to Indian country jails was 9,640 during the month of June 2016, giving us an idea of “jail churn” in facilities on tribal lands. Additionally, this report is one of the very few sources for this population’s offense data, although even here, about 35% of offenses are unhelpfully categorized as “other.”

Youth: People under the age of 21 make up 42% of American Indian/Alaskan Native populations in the United States, so Native youth confinement is a special concern. With a detention rate of 255 per 100,000 in 2015, Native youth are approximately three times more likely to be confined than white youth (83 per 100,000). In Indian country jails, approximately 6% of the confined population was 17 or younger in 2016; unfortunately, the number of youth held in other adult prisons and jails is not broken down by race/ethnicity. The Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement reports data on Native youth in juvenile justice facilities across the U.S., most recently for 2017, including details about offense type, facility type, sex, age, and more.

Contributing to these confinement rates is disproportionate police contact: Native youth are arrested at a much higher rate than white youth. The 2018 arrest rate for Native youth was 2,251 per 100,000 while white youth were arrested at a rate of 1,793 per 100,000.

Data collection from Native populations suffers from a number of limitations

Data collection efforts in tribal communities face a number of problems that limit the data’s accuracy and comprehensiveness.

According to the National Institute of Justice, issues such as difficulty in outreach, overlapping jurisdictions, and differences between tribal justice systems make the collection of data from these communities especially challenging. U.S. government policies and priorities also limit the data it collects and reports about Native populations:

  • The DOJ has moved slowly: A Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight report in compliance with the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) states that the “TLOA requires the Department’s BJS to collect data related to crimes in Indian country. However, 7 years after TLOA became law, its data collection and reporting efforts are still in development.”
  • Reporting is voluntary: According to the same report,“…because participation in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program is voluntary, not all tribes report crime statistics into the UCR database. As a result, Indian country crime statistics are so outdated and incomplete as to be virtually useless.” The BJS derives most of its crime data from the UCR program, which is especially incomplete when it comes to tribal jurisdictions’ data. The DOJ report found that while “207 tribes reported to the UCR in 2014, only 115 tribes submitted complete information that was included in the final UCR report.” It’s worth mentioning that there are, as of 2017, 226 tribal law enforcement agencies recognized by the federal government. Assuming the same number existed in 2014, that means 19 (8%) did not report crime data at all.
  • Data collection does not distinguish between tribes: According to the DOJ report, the National Crime Victimization Survey “does not allow the calculation of separate crime statistics for each American Indian tribe.” A report from the United States Sentencing Commission’s Tribal Issues Advisory Group also cites a lack of accurate databases in tribal courts, consistent and comparable disaggregation, and data sharing between federal and tribal entities.
  • Data aren’t used to help Native communities: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Report notes that the limited data that is collected has not been used to “evaluate and improve” law enforcement activities in Indian country. This adds to the strain caused by the general lack of cooperation between U.S. and tribal justice systems: According to a report by the National Tribal Judicial Center, federal and state correctional facilities “do not notify tribes of inmate release to parole or probation.” The report notes that tribal “protection orders are not validated by or enforced by state courts or state law enforcement. No outside agencies honor tribal court subpoenas.” This lack of reciprocity worsens the already countless issues with data collection and sharing.
  • Cultural and socioeconomic barriers lead to undercounting: More broadly, a “distrust of the U.S. government, a youth-heavy population, nontraditional addresses, low internet access, language and literacy barriers, weather and road access issues, and high rates of poverty and houselessness” create a deeply problematic undercounting of American Indian/Alaskan Native people. (A report by Rewire.News examines the consequences of this undercounting, including lower representation in Congress, funding deficits in health and human services, and a decline in tribal recognition and enrollment.)

“Other” data obscurities

Criminal justice data often uses racial and ethnic categories to break down the disproportionately high representation of Black and Hispanic populations in prisons and jails. Beyond these categories, however, lies the illusive “other” designation, which lumps together Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, Native Hawaiians, and of course, American Indians and Alaskan Natives. However, as the Census data reveals, disproportionate incarceration rates for these groups are not negligible. This practice obscures differences between these groups and makes it difficult to determine how the justice system plays a role in Native communities. Specifically:

  • The Bureau of Justice Statistics categorizes American Indian/Alaskan Natives as “other” in their Felony Sentences in State Courts data series. According to research by the Native American Voting Rights Coalition, several Native women surveyed mentioned that their husbands/partners were ineligible to vote due to felony convictions, contributing to a variety of barriers that hinder Native American political participation. The lack of disaggregated data makes it difficult to determine the exact proportion of Natives who are disenfranchised.
  • According to the American Indian and Alaskan Natives in Local Jails report, there were 56,400 individuals in jails – in addition to those categorized as “single race” American Indian/Alaskan Native – who identified as American Indian/Alaskan Native and another race(s) or ethnicity, suggesting higher rates of incarceration nationwide if multi-racial individuals were included in Native population counts or rates.
  • Rewire.News’s report also highlights how gender categorization of Native populations can often obscure those who identify as Two Spirit, non-binary, or transgender.

As it stands, there are many more questions than answers about Native Americans in the criminal justice system. Until criminal justice agencies overcome the limitations on data collection — and until the offices that publish the data are willing to list Native Americans as a distinct demographic group, rather than a member of an “Other” category — informational gaps will continue to make it difficult to understand how overcriminalization has impacted Native populations.


We sent state prison systems a 5-question survey, and the answers – largely – are not encouraging.

by Emily Widra and Peter Wagner, April 10, 2020

Many local jails and pretrial systems are taking action to reduce their populations in advance of the COVID-19 pandemic, but state prison systems are not, raising the question: Are state prisons prepared to handle a pandemic within their walls? We set out to survey prison systems on the capacity of their health facilities, their plans for any necessary external hospitalizations, their levels of equipment, their staffing levels and their general priorities.

Unfortunately, our April 3-10 survey shows that state prisons are still largely unprepared for a global pandemic that can reasonably be expected to hit their entire state prison system — and their supporting state government — all at the same time.

Most prisons are still aiming to keep the virus out of their facilities, rather than focusing on how to minimize the harm to incarcerated people, to their staff and to society as a whole. Containment might be a reasonable goal when it comes to outbreaks of flu, tuberculosis, or MRSA – diseases that prison systems know how to guard against by vaccinating people, screening, and so on. But COVID-19 is different both in terms of how it spreads and by the fact that it is already stressing the public hospital system that state prisons historically rely on for back-up support.

Given the number of large number of staff required to run a facility1 and the apparent ease with which asymptomatic people can infect others, no combination of security restrictions — such as suspending family visitation, checking the temperature of incoming staff, or confining the entire population to their cells — can keep out the virus that causes COVID-19 for long.2 And once the virus enters a facility, the density and lack of sanitation will allow it to spread quickly to all incarcerated people and staff, and will accelerate the spread to the surrounding community.

Ideally, state prisons’ first response to the pandemic should have been to do like many jails and reduce the number of people incarcerated. But at the very least, we expected to see them developing plans that acknowledged the inevitability of a COVID-19 outbreak and its unique challenges. Their plans should anticipate the need to isolate vulnerable people, work around staffing shortages, and navigate shortages of medical supplies and hospital beds. But except for a few notable exceptions — particularly North Dakota — most states have not even gotten that far.

The good news is that in some states, the spread of the virus is several weeks behind other states, so some of the states that are the least ready still have the potential to learn from other states and improve their planning.

The state of pandemic planning in state prisons

In our survey of state Departments of Corrections, we sought to gather more information about how states are preparing for the pandemic to breach the prison gates. We asked about five major topics of pandemic preparedness:

  1. the capacity for isolating particularly vulnerable individuals and quarantining people with suspected cases of COVID-19 within facilities,
  2. protocols for people requiring hospitalization,
  3. equipment (including ventilators, medical-grade PPE, COVID-19 tests) accessible to facilities,
  4. anticipated staffing changes and availability of healthcare staff within facilities, and
  5. what the most immediate priorities are in planning for a COVID-19 outbreak in correctional facilities.

You can read the individual responses, but let’s jump to what the answers should have been.

We hoped to hear from each state that steps were being taken to prepare facilities to navigate the inevitable: a positive COVID-19 test among the hundreds of people living in close proximity to one another in prison. We expected each facility to have designated cells, units, or wings that could be easily isolated from the rest of the facility to allow either isolation of people who are particularly vulnerable to complications from COVID-19, or quarantine of people who test positive for COVID-19.

Given the recommendation from expert Dr. Homer Venters that facilities establish a plan for hospitalizations that recognizes that staff will be in short supply, and thus does not require the usual 2:1 ratio of correctional officers to patients, we expected correctional departments to have established new pathways and protocols for hospitalization.

We also expected that because prisons have finite resources for respiratory support (such as oxygen), facilities would have realistic plans to transfer people to hospitals while protecting staff from exposure. We hoped prisons could tell us how they would secure sufficient equipment and supplies, and how they will respond when supplies run out or when hospitals refuse to admit. (For example, there is already a shortage of COVID-19 tests, restrictions on who can be tested, and personal protective equipment (PPE) for medical professionals is already in short supply.) This planning, unfortunately, was largely absent.

Given the rate of infection and the length of hospitalization for severe cases of COVID-19, it is reasonable to assume facilities will encounter staffing shortages and that plans need to be in place for making sure the essential services behind bars continue in the face of staff calling out sick (i.e. food, medical care, telephone access, etc.). Given that most correctional staff are already stretched thin, departments should have begun planning for a staffing shortage weeks ago by reducing the number of people incarcerated and reducing the burden on staff. Most departments did not, but we still expected that they were preparing for the medical challenge created by that inaction.

The responses we received were largely disappointing. Rather than developing plans to mitigate the harm of an inevitable outbreak, most states are still focusing on restricting the movements of incarcerated people within facilities — in other words, attempting to “contain” the virus, which is all but impossible with COVID-19.

Even worse, some state departments of corrections informed us that no changes to their existing medical capacity were needed, suggesting that their established medical facilities and staff were sufficient to combat a disease that is overwhelming entire city infrastructures across the nation. Other states notified us that because no positive cases had occurred in their prisons, many changes have not yet been implemented. A number of states referred us back to their websites, which although providing up-to-date information on some aspects of their COVID-19 response, did not answer the specific questions about policy and planning changes in the past few weeks.

The good news is that many states still have time to do a far better job. At this point, on April 10, state Departments of Corrections need to be focused on mitigating the disastrous consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic entering prisons, rather than sticking to the belief that their high prison walls can effectively keep a global virus at bay.

 

Footnotes

  1. Every facility is different, but outside observers can roughly estimate the number of staff that go in and out of a facility by dividing the incarcerated population by 4.6 for jails and 4.7 for prisons. (The typical jail has one staff member for every 3.3 incarcerated people, and the typical prison has one staff member for every 3.4 incarcerated people. If you assume that the staff work 5 days out of 7, you can divide the incarcerated population by 4.6 or 4.7 to get an estimate of how many staff enter and leave the facility every 24 hours.)

    The initial incarcerated to staff ratios of 3.3 and 3.4 were calculated from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Jail Inmates in 2018 and Census Of State And Federal Correctional Facilities, 2005, Appendix Table 14.  ↩

  2. We are separately tracking press releases and updates from state departments of corrections on visitation suspension, changes in communication costs, screening policies for staff and new admissions, and facility lockdowns.
     ↩




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